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Regulation, supervision and deposit insurance for financial 
cooperatives: an empirical investigation
† 
Amr Khafagy 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of different regulation and supervision approaches, as 
well as deposit insurance schemes, on the development of financial cooperatives in 
developing countries, using random and fixed effects estimators. Information on laws 
regulating financial cooperatives, the supervisory approaches adopted, and deposit 
insurance schemes in sixty-five developing countries were collected—mostly—from 
original legislations for the period 1995–2014. Key findings suggest that indicators of 
financial cooperative development are positively correlated with the existence of a 
specialized regulation; supervision under non-bank financial supervisory authorities; 
and the presence of deposit insurance schemes, while general cooperative society’s 
regulations and banking regulations are negatively correlated with financial 
cooperatives’ indicators. These results are robust after controlling for economic and 
institutional factors as well as potential endogeneity bias. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2007–2008 financial crisis showed how rapid financial expansion without sufficient 
regulation could have drastic consequences that go beyond the financial sector and 
threaten the stability of the whole economy. A financial system dominated solely by 
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joint-stock commercial and investment banks may have serious weaknesses and 
systemic risks that affect the stability of the sector. Growing empirical literature suggest 
that financial cooperatives tend to be more stable as they are risk-averse and less 
exposed to capital markets’ volatilities, and—in many cases as or—more cost-efficient 
compared to other commercial banks. In addition, there is solid empirical literature 
showing that financial cooperatives provide credit to more small and medium 
enterprises than commercial banks do, and are better able to reach low-income 
populations than other microfinance institutions.
1
 Yet, few empirical studies explored 
why financial cooperatives grow in some emerging economies and not in other similar 
ones. Périlleux et al. (2016) argued that financial cooperatives benefit from the 
underdevelopment of the commercial banking sector in developing countries, while 
Khafagy (2017) found that political institutions have incentives to deliberately oppose 
or support the development of financial cooperatives. This essay is highly inspired by 
Cuevas and Fischer (2006). Here I used unbalanced panel data covering the period from 
1995 to 2014 to examine the impact of different regulation and supervision approaches, 
in addition to deposit insurance schemes, on the development of financial cooperatives 
in developing countries. An enabling regulatory and supervisory environment is a 
prerequisite for the growth and development of financial cooperatives, and as the sector 
grows and becomes more complex, regulations must be responsive to ensure the 
stability and the effectiveness of the sector. 
In many developing countries, financial cooperatives are fully regulated by a general 
cooperative societies’ law that regulates all type of cooperative organisations, including 
non-financial cooperatives (e.g. agricultural, consumer, or housing cooperatives…etc.), 
ignoring the financial intermediation nature of financial cooperatives. While in other 
countries, financial cooperatives fall completely under the regulatory and supervisory 
responsibility of the central bank or the bank superintendence. In the last decade, more 
countries adopted a specialised law for financial cooperatives or separate and detailed 
provisions regulating financial cooperatives under a non-specialised financial 
cooperatives law. In few countries, especially in Latin America, central banks or bank 
superintendence regulate and supervise large financial cooperatives only while smaller 
financial cooperatives fall under different regulatory framework. Other countries keep 
                                                          
1
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financial cooperatives under legislations intended to govern the operations of all 
microfinance institutions. There is no common agreement over which of these different 
legal approaches work better to support the growth and resilience of the sector in 
developing countries. In addition, there is no empirical evidence that argues in favour of 
a specific supervisory approach to be more suitable for financial cooperatives, or 
whether deposit insurance schemes enhance or threaten the growth of financial 
cooperatives. In this chapter, I tried to explore whether the size and outreach of the 
financial cooperative sector is shaped by the regulatory and supervisory approach 
adopted, and if deposit insurance schemes support or discourage the development of the 
sector. 
The findings of this chapter has important policy implications suggesting that a 
specialised regulation for financial cooperatives is more likely to support the growth of 
the sector, while there is a serious concern over the viability of applying commercial 
banks or cooperative societies’ regulations to financial cooperatives. In addition, the 
analysis encourages the introduction of deposit insurance as an important instrument 
that can promote confidence in the sector. The following sections of the chapter are 
organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses current regulation and supervision 
approaches, and the advantages and disadvantages of deposit insurance schemes and 
their implication on financial cooperatives. Section 3 defines the data and the 
methodology used. Results are presented and interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Regulation, supervision and deposit insurance for financial cooperatives 
Financial Cooperatives’—hereafter as FCs—are member-owned financial institutions 
such as cooperative banks, credit unions, credit cooperatives, as well as savings and 
credit cooperatives. Benefiting from strong social relations between small-group 
members, FCs with few members are similar to formalised rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) that are able to provide financial services to their members at 
low operational costs, by reducing information asymmetry problems associated with 
any financial intermediation. However, social relations and FCs’ informational 
advantage weaken as the number of members grows, and establishing an efficient 
regulatory framework becomes necessary (Poyo 2000: 140). There are strong incentives 
to put the FC sector under a prudential regulatory and supervisory framework regardless 
of their size. Jansson et al. (2004: 51) explained that large FCs should be regulated 
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under prudential regulation and supervision in order to protect the deposits of large 
number of cooperative members. Furthermore, common bond is probably weak in large 
FCs making self-supervision more difficult, besides that large FCs may impose 
systematic risk to the whole sector. While acknowledging the challenges of applying 
prudential regulation and supervision on small FCs, Jansson et al. (2004: 51) does not 
undermine the importance of putting small FCs under the supervision of a qualified 
authority. In addition to the delegated/auxiliary approach—explained below—they 
recommend charging FCs a cost-covering supervision fees to ensure adequate 
supervision and to avoid cross-subsidising FCs by commercial banks. 
FCs regulation should guide basic credit operations such as—among other things—
internal credit policy, pricing, defining collaterals, contractual transparency, legal 
reserves, documentation, risk classification and risk weighting, non-performing loans, 
loan loss provisions and write-offs (Jansson et al. 2004: 27–48). In addition, FCs 
regulation should maintain the autonomy of cooperatives and protect the sector from 
unsupportive government interference (Bamrungwon 1994: 55–56; Musumal 1994: 
157–158; Münkner 2014; Khafagy 2017), mitigate agency problems inherited in 
cooperatives governance structure (Taylor 1971;Westley and Shaffer 2000: 87; Branch 
and Baker 2000: 210–211; Cuevas and Fischer 2006). Regulations should also support 
institutional integration between financial cooperatives and facilitate the creation of 
second-tier cooperatives or federations (Poyo 1995: 31; Guinnane 1997: 251–252; 
Desrochers and Fischer 2003; Cuevas and Fischer 2006: 16–17), and set adequate 
capital requirements (Davis 1994; BCBS 2012, 2015a, b). 
The most desired approach for designing a cooperative law is participatory law-making 
process as suggested by (Münkner 1986: 123) in which cooperative representatives (e.g. 
second-tier cooperatives or federations) directly contribute, along with the legislator, in 
framing the cooperative legislation. Poprawa (2009: 2) argued that the evolution of FCs’ 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks in most countries is highly associated with the 
development stage of the movement. In early stages, regulations focus on licensing and 
registration only. While in more advanced stages, policy makers introduce prudential 
measurements, financial and regulatory reporting standards, through the establishment 
of prudential standards and risk-based supervision framework that aims to assess capital 
adequacy and mitigate liquidity risks. Finally, in a well-developed financial cooperative 
system, the regulatory framework enforces a deposit guarantee system that creates 
confidence to depositors that their money is protected partly or fully. Cuevas and 
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Fischer (2006: 30) recognized three main legal frameworks that govern the FC sector in 
most countries. These are a specialized FC law, a general cooperative society’s law, and 
a banking law. The latter framework is usually applied on all country’s banking sector, 
including FCs, or only applied to large cooperatives while smaller ones are left to the 
cooperative society’s law. Cuevas and Fischer (2006) called this legal approach a “dual 
regime”, widely common in Latin America, where only few FCs are governed by the 
banking authorities based on specific criteria, such as the size of the cooperative or if it 
provides services to non-members (open FCs). Table 1 below follows Cuevas and 
Fischer (2006: 45) and compares regulation and supervision approaches adopted by 
countries included in the sample to govern the activities of FCs in 1995 versus 2014. 
The table shows how several countries in the last two decades chose to regulate FCs 
through a specialised law or separate provisions instead of general cooperative law or 
commercial bank law.  
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Table 1. Regulation and supervision approaches of financial cooperatives in 1995 vs 2014 
Financial cooperatives regulation and supervision approaches in 1995 
 
Cooperative society’s 
 regulation 
Specialized financial  
cooperatives regulation 
NBFIs 
regulation 
Dual regulatory  
regime 
General Banking  
regulation 
Cooperative 
societies 
supervision 
Bangladesh 
Belarus¹ 
Benin 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
Dominican 
Republic 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Macedonia² 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Romania² 
Rwanda 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Uganda 
Uzbekist-
an³ 
Viet Nam² 
Zimbabwe 
Cameroon 
  
Colombia 
   
NBFIs supervisory 
authority   
Burkina 
Faso      
Banking authority 
supervision 
Peru 
 
Azerbaijan 
Gambia 
Lithuania 
Mali 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Senegal 
Cambodia⁴ 
 
Brazil 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Dual supervisory 
regime   
Costa Rica Philippines 
 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
India 
Uruguay   
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Auxiliary 
supervision 
Jamaica 
Malawi 
Mexico 
Poland 
Russia  
South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
 
Ghana 
   
 
Financial cooperatives regulation and supervision approaches in 2014 
 
Cooperative society’s 
 regulation 
Specialized financial  
cooperatives regulation 
NBFIs 
regulation 
Dual regulatory  
regime 
General Banking  
regulation 
Cooperative 
societies 
supervision 
Belarus 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Indonesia 
Paraguay       
NBFIs supervisory 
authority   
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
Ecuador 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Kenya 
Mali 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Niger 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Ukraine  
Bangladesh 
   
Banking authority 
supervision   
Azerbaijan 
Gambia 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Malawi 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Poland 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Uzbekistan³ 
Cambodia 
Cameroon    
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Viet Nam  
Dual supervisory 
regime   
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Philippines 
Uruguay   
Chile 
El 
Salvador 
Honduras 
India 
Nepal    
Auxiliary 
supervision 
Jamaica 
 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Peru 
Russia  
Ghana 
   
Source: author's compilation 
¹ Belarus as of 1998; ² Macedonia, Romania and Viet Nam as of 1996; ³ Uzbekistan as of 2002 and 2010; and ⁴ Cambodia, as of 1997. 
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While for supervision, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervisions (BCBS) had 
recently issued Guidance for the implementation of its ‘Core Principles’ for institutions 
engaged in financial inclusion, which addresses financial cooperatives, among other 
microfinance providers. The Core Principles provide adequate guidance for supervising 
banks, as well as non-bank depository financial institutions, proposing that different 
types of financial institutions should be regulated differently than commercial banks, 
especially if they do not possess a significant percentage of the financial system’s 
deposits. In addition, supervision can be reduced to monitoring only when there are 
large numbers of small non-bank depository financial institutions operating in 
geographically remote areas. The Guidance encourages proportionate supervision 
approach, so that countries can allocate supervisory resources efficiently among the 
financial system based on the risk-associated by the financial institution on depositors 
and the whole financial system (BCBS 2012: 13 and BCBS 2015b: 5–9). Currently, 
there are four types of supervisory approaches adopted to monitor the FC sector in 
developing countries (Cuevas and Fischer 2006: 45; Poprawa 2009: 2–3). First 
approach is direct supervision by a prudential regulator over the entire sector. Second 
approach is direct supervision over large FCs only, while small FCs are supervised by 
another governmental agency (like ministries of cooperatives with limited non-
prudential monitoring. Third approach is delegated or auxiliary supervision which gives 
the supervisory responsibility to a third party—most commonly to the national 
federation of FCs. Last approach is supervision by ministries of cooperatives that 
regulate and supervise the entire cooperative sector, including agricultural or housing 
cooperatives, and other non-financial cooperatives. 
Finally, deposit insurance schemes are widely recommended to protect depositors’ 
assets and the total financial system from bank runs, however, the effectiveness of 
deposit insurance remains quite controversial. The general economic theory suggests 
that deposit insurance can improve the stability of banks by reducing the possibility of 
depositors’ runs. However, such explicit safety net of insurance may reduce market 
discipline and creates amoral hazard by providing incentives for banks to invest in 
riskier assets, without being sufficiently monitored by the depositors, because any losses 
incurred will be shifted from the depositors to the insurance fund (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache 2002: 1378). Several empirical findings suggest that deposit insurance 
schemes tend to increase banks’ instability, risk-taking behaviour, and reduce 
monitoring of large depositors on banks (Grossman 1992; Alston et al. 1994; Demirgüç-
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Kunt and Detragiache 2002; Ioannidou and Penas 2010). While Hovakimian et al. 
(2003) found that introducing deposit insurance schemes might increase risk-taking 
behaviour for banks operating in countries with weak institutional structures such as 
low political and economic freedoms, high corruption and poor contract enforcement 
mechanisms. Contrary to that, Gropp and Vesala (2004) found that risk-taking 
behaviour of European banks had significantly decreased after the introduction of 
explicit deposit insurance. But unlike investor-owned financial institutions, there is no 
evidence in the literature of financial cooperatives supporting the argument that the 
adoption of deposit insurance schemes increases the likelihood of institutions to adopt 
risk-taking behaviour. That is because theoretically, the mutual ownership structure 
implies limited risk-taking behaviour. In investor-owned firm, shareholders are only 
residual claimants, thus they have incentives to adopt riskier behaviour as they can gain 
benefits from higher dividends or selling shares at market value. Shares in investor-
owned financial institutions are considered highly leveraged claims on the institution’s 
residual profits, unlike mutual institutions where shareholders are also depositors, thus 
their shares are unleveraged (Karels and McClatchey 1999: 107–108). Moreover, 
several approaches can make deposit insurance schemes for FCs more incentive 
compatible, and reduce agency costs and moral hazard. One approach is limited 
coverage that makes the insurance forces large depositors to closely monitor the 
performance of the institutions, and which will increase market discipline. Similar 
approach is coinsurance, in which depositors are not compensated for their total 
deposits, thus some of the depositors will be forced to monitor the institutions’ risk 
strategy as they are exposed to losses (Beck 2004). Another commonly preferred 
approach is risk-based deposit insurance, where insurance premiums are adjusted to 
reflect the risk of the institution’s assets or capital adequacy performance (Hannafin and 
Mckillop 2007: 47).  
3. Data and method 
Common measurements of financial sector development—as a whole—cover the size, 
depth, efficiency and stability of the sector (Beck et al. 1999). However, the available 
data on FCs can only reflect the size and depth of the sector and do not give insightful 
information on the level of efficiency and stability of the sector in most countries. The 
data used here to measure the level of development of the FC sector was obtained from 
the annual statistical reports of the World Council of Credit Union’s (WOCCU). 
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WOCCU’s dataset are the most comprehensive dataset available for FCs. Additional 
data on primary agricultural credit cooperatives in India was collected from the National 
Federation of State Cooperative Banks. FCs development is measured using three 
indicators. First indicator is member penetration rate; which is the total number of FCs’ 
members as percentage of the total economically active population (obtained from 
International Labour Organization—ILO) in each country. This variable can reflect the 
depth of the sector and its ability to attract and organise people. Second and third 
indicators are FCs’ total deposits and assets per GDP. Both indicators show the sector’s 
size in the national economy. The three variables were log transformed to normalize 
data distribution. 
Information on regulations governing FCs, the responsible supervisory agencies, and 
deposit insurance schemes in sixty-five developing countries were self-collected by the 
author for the period from 1995 to 2014. These data were mainly collected from original 
legislations, and only for view countries, I relied on secondary sources, like central 
banks reports and international monetary fund reports (and other multilateral 
institutions). Annex 4 presents a list of all laws and sources reviewed. Countries 
covered in the study are those with total population greater than 500,000 per country 
and are classified as emerging and developing economies by the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF)World Economic Outlook of 2012 (IMF 2012: 181). Tables 2 and 3 below 
provide an overview over variables used to measure FCs development, as well as the 
classification of regulatory, supervisory and deposit insurance variables, as well as the 
control. 
Fixed and random effects ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are used to measure 
the relationship between FCs’ indicators and the type of regulation that governs them, 
the supervisory agency responsible to monitor their activities, and the existence of a 
deposit insurance scheme for the period from 1995 to 2014. Using panel data is 
convenient in this study to observe how changes in FCs’ regulations, supervisory 
authority or the introduction of deposit insurance scheme affect the changes in size and 
depth of the sector in the economy. The basic structure for the OLS regression models 
here take the form of 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. (1) 
The fixed-effect estimator performs OLS regression on 
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(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) = 𝛼 + (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)𝛽 + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖). (2) 
 
For each investigation (regulation, supervision and deposit insurance), I performed three 
tests reported in panels A, B and C in tables 4, 5 and 6 and A1, A2 and A3. In Panel A, 
the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the logarithm of indicators used as proxy for the 
development of the FC sector in country 𝑖 at year 𝑡. Namely, 𝑦 denotes log(penetration 
rate), log(deposits per GDP), and log(assets per GDP). In addition, 𝛼 is the intercept, 
and 𝛽 are the coefficients that need to be estimated to determine the potential 
relationship between the dependent variables 𝑦 and each explanatory variable 𝑋. Since 
there are three main tests in the study, the explanatory variables 𝑋 represent dummy 
variables for laws regulating FCs in the first test; the responsible supervisory agency in 
the second test; and the existence of deposit insurance scheme in the last test. In 
addition, the explanatory variables include a set of variables to control for gross 
domestic production (GDP) per capita, domestic credit provided to private sector as 
percentage of the GDP, legal origin, and geographic region. The control variables were 
selected following findings from earlier research reported in Khafagy (2017). 
Accordingly, I excluded GDP growth rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate and 
percenatge of urban population from the estimations here for weak or lack of statistical 
significant correlations with FCs’ indicators. Moreover 𝜇𝑖 are time-invariant and 
unobservable country-specific effects that were not included in the regression and differ 
across countries (e.g. political and cultural country-specifications). Whereas 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are the 
remainder disturbances which varies across countries and years, and has similar 
characteristics to the usual “error term” of linear regression equation, assumed to be 
homoscedastic, normally distributed with a mean equals to zero, uncorrelated with 
itself, and uncorrelated with  𝜇𝑖 and 𝑋.  
Panels B explain the effect of changing FCs’ regulatory framework or supervisory 
approaches or introducing deposit insurance schemes in year (𝑡 − 1) on the growth of 
FCs’ indicators in year 𝑡. Thus, the dependent variable in panels B are the change in 
FCs’ indicators using the first difference of log(penetration rate), log(deposits per 
GDP), and log(assets per GDP). The changes in FCs’ indicators are regressed against 
the first lag of the indicators and the first lag of the main explanatory variables 
(regulations, supervisions, and deposit insurance) in addition to the control variables 
used in panels A regressions. Finally, panels C report results of reversed regressions, to 
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explore whether the size and depth of the sector predetermine the type of regulatory and 
supervisory approaches and the presence of deposit insurance schemes or not. The 
reversed regressions also show if the presence of deposit insurance or a specific 
regulatory and supervisory approach is associated with the level of economic 
development of a country or the size of its financial sector. For that, the dependent 
variables in the regressions of panels C are the dummy variables that represent the type 
of FCs regulation and supervision and the presence of deposit insurance. These 
variables are regressed against the first lags of: FCs indicators, GDP per Capita, 
domestic credit provided to private sector, besides the control variables mentioned 
before.  
A main advantage of fixed and random effects estimators is that they recognise the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity between the countries. Fixed effect estimator, 
known as the within estimator, treats 𝜇𝑖 as fixed parameters that do not have a 
distribution. It controls for all country-specific effects and these time-invariant 
parameters are omitted. The remainder disturbances 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed (IID), while 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be correlated with 𝜇𝑖 and 
independent from 𝜈𝑖𝑡  for all countries 𝑖 at any period 𝑡 (Baltagi 2005: 12-13 and Stata 
2013: 366 and 384). The standard errors reported for the OLS regressions are obtained 
using Huber-White sandwich robust estimator to correct for the heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation indicated by Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test and Lagram-
Multiplier test. The coefficients estimated by the robust estimator of variance are similar 
to the coefficients produced by the non-robust estimators, however, the robust estimator 
of variance allows us to relax the assumption of identically distributed disturbances 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
over the panels, and the no serial correlation assumption (Stata 2013: 383). I report 
regression results obtained only from the fixed-effects estimations following Hausman-
test results and the high correlation between the country-specific effects 𝜇𝑖 and the 
explanatory variables 𝑋 found in all the regressions, all which suggest fixed-effects 
estimations to be more efficient than random-effects estimations for the analysis. The 
random-effects results are reported in the appendices. Moreover, the R-squared within 
in the baseline regressions (panels A) range from 29.8 per cent to 38.6 per cent, noting 
that the reported R-squared “within” obtained from a fixed effects estimator is 
equivalent to ordinary R-squared of OLS regressions. Tables 2 below provide a brief 
statistical description on the variables included in the model, and table 3 gives an 
overview on the data sources and variables used in the analysis. 
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Table 2. Data description 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max N 
Log penetration rate −1.50 0.75 −4.47 −0.11 1108 
Log deposit per GDP −2.64 0.92 −6.00 −0.92 1065 
log assets per GDP −2.46 0.91 −5.71 −0.83 1035 
Cooperative societies' regulation 0.40 0.49 0 1 1108 
Specialized financial cooperatives 
regulation 
0.44 0.50 0 1 1108 
Dual regulatory regime 0.09 0.29 0 1 1108 
General banking regulation 0.01 0.12 0 1 1108 
Non-bank financial institutions 
regulation 
0.05 0.23 0 1 1108 
Cooperative societies' supervision 0.36 0.48 0 1 1108 
Auxiliary supervision 0.14 0.35 0 1 1108 
Dual supervisory regime 0.16 0.36 0 1 1108 
Banking authority supervision 0.18 0.39 0 1 1108 
Non-bank financial institutions 
supervision  
0.15 0.36 0 1 1108 
Deposit insurance 0.28 0.45 0 1 1108 
Log GDP per capita  3.17 0.47 2.10 4.05 1108 
Domestic credit to private sector 0.34 0.26 0.01 1.66 1108 
Financial freedom 0.48 0.16 0.1 0.9 1108 
Property rights 0.41 0.16 0.05 0.9 1108 
Legal origin 0.86 0.72 0 2 1108 
Region 2.42 1.24 1 4 1108 
 
Table 3. Information on the data sources and variables used in the analysis 
Financial cooperatives variables (dependent variables) 
Penetration 
rate 
The total number of financial cooperatives’ members in a country 
obtained from the WOCCU, as percentage of the total economically 
active population, obtained from International Labour Organization 
statistics. The variable was log transformed to normalize data 
distribution. 
Total deposits 
per GDP 
The total deposits of financial cooperatives in a country, reported by the 
WOCCU, as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 
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market prices. The variable was log transformed. 
Total assets 
per GDP
2
 
The total assets of financial cooperatives in a country, reported by the 
WOCCU, as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 
market prices. The variable was log transformed. 
Regulations, supervision and deposit insurance variables (explanatory variables) 
Cooperative 
society’s 
regulation 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
fully regulated under a general cooperative society’s law that regulate 
the operations of all forms of organizations with a cooperative 
ownership structure, without any special provisions for financial 
cooperatives concerning credit and deposit services, and capital 
requirements, or statutory provisions concerning financial 
intermediation activities. 
Specialized 
financial 
cooperatives 
regulation 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
regulated by a specialised law or  regulated under special or detailed 
provisions under a non-specialised financial cooperatives law. 
General 
Banking 
regulation 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
fully regulated by the banking law. 
Dual 
regulatory 
regime 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the financial cooperative 
sector is regulated by two separate legal frameworks, that is some 
financial cooperatives are regulated under a general cooperative law, 
while other financial cooperatives are regulated by the banking law, 
based on specific criteria (based on assets size, minimum capital 
requirements, providing services to non-members). 
Non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
regulation 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
fully regulated by a law regulating other non-bank financial institutions 
(e.g. microfinance laws). 
Cooperative 
societies 
supervision 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
supervised by a government authority that supervises and monitors all 
types of cooperative organizations 
                                                          
2 
Missing data for total assets in West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'voire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) were calculated using average total assets to total savings ratio 
from other available years of the same country. 
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Non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
supervisory 
authority 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
supervised by a government authority that supervises and monitors 
other non-bank financial institutions (microfinance institutions). Noting 
that I did not include a separate dummy variable for a specialised 
financial cooperative supervisory authority, because in our sample 
special governmental supervisory authorities supervise only financial 
cooperatives in Kenya and South Africa. 
Banking 
authority 
supervision 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
supervised by banking authorities (e.g. central bank or bank 
superintendent). 
Dual 
supervisory 
regime 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives by 
two different supervisory authorities, that is some financial 
cooperatives are supervised by a general cooperative supervisor (e.g. 
ministry), while other financial cooperatives are supervised by the 
banking authorities, based on specific criteria (e.g. based on assets size, 
minimum capital requirements, providing services to non-members). 
Auxiliary 
supervision 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives are 
supervised by indirect supervisory approach, where the responsible 
authority allows another organisation to take defined supervisory 
responsibilities. 
Deposit 
insurance  
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if financial cooperatives’ 
deposits are covered by a deposit insurance scheme or other similar 
arrangements. 
Control variables 
GDP per 
capita  
Calculated as the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by 
midyear population of a country. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars 
as obtained from the World Bank Open Data. This variable was log 
transformed. 
Domestic 
Credit to 
private sector 
Financial resources provided by depository institutions to the private 
sector that create a claim for repayment, as percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices. Data obtained from World 
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by banks as 
(%GDP)
3
 
Bank Open Data 
Property 
rights 
This indicator is obtained from the Index of Economic Freedom 
released by the Heritage Foundation, and measures the degree to which 
private property rights are secured by clear and enforceable laws or not, 
and evaluates the independence and corruption of the judiciary, as well 
as the ability of individuals and firms to enforce contracts.  
Financial 
freedom 
This indicator is obtained from the Index of Economic Freedom 
released by the Heritage Foundation, which measures the independence 
of the banking sector from government control and interference.  
Legal origin 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the country’s legal 
system is based on British common law, the value of 1 for French civil 
law origins, and the value of 2 for socialist laws. Data obtained from La 
Porta et al. (1999). 
Geographic 
region 
A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘0’ for African Countries, ‘1’ 
for Countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘2’ for Asian 
Countries, and ‘3’ for European Countries. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Financial cooperatives regulations 
Table 4 shows regression results that examine the relationship between indicators of 
FCs and the type of regulation governing their activities. In panel A, each of the three 
indicators (natural logarithm of penetration rate, deposits per GDP, and assets per GDP) 
are regressed against dummy variables representing the type of the relevant regulation. 
The main explanatory variables are dummy variables representing specialised financial 
cooperative regulation; dual regulatory regime; banking regulation, non-bank financial 
institutions regulation (NBFI); and general cooperative society’s regulation, in addition 
to a set of variables to control for GDP per capita, credit to private sector, financial 
freedom and property rights. In panel B, the changes in FCs’ indicators are regressed 
against the first lag of the main explanatory variables, and the first lag of the FC 
                                                          
3 
Data for Uzbekistan were collected from the International Monetary Fund country reports (2006 No. 
07/133; 2008 No. 08/235; and 2013 No. 13/278) and for Zimbabwe from the Central bank, under 
domestic statistics (available at http://www.rbz.co.zw/assets/monthly-economic-data-from-2009-to-
date.pdf).
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indicator to control for the impact of the sector’s size and outreach on its growth. 
Finally, panel C reports the reversed regressions.  
Columns (1), (6) and (11) in panels A and B of table 4 suggest a positive statistical 
correlation between the existence of a specialized FC regulation and higher members’ 
penetration rate, deposits per GDP and assets per GDP. Panel B suggests that countries 
with specialised FC regulation have experienced positive change in the sector’s 
penetration rate, deposits and assets per GDP. The results supports the argument that a 
specialised regulation may boost the growth and outreach of the sector, because FCs 
need a different legal framework that addresses their unique economic objectives and 
their distinctive ownership structure that differ from traditional investor-owned financial 
institutions and also other types of cooperative organisations. Results of panel C suggest 
also that countries with high penetration rates are most likely to be regulated by a 
specialised regulation in the following year. Thus, it might also be the case that high 
penetration rates push governments to introduce specialised laws (or detailed provisions 
in existing laws) for regulating the sector, as it becomes economically and politically 
significant. It is difficult to claim with certainty that changes in the type of regulation 
has a causal effect on the growth of the sector, as generally, the results of fixed-effects 
regressions does not prove causation, thus it does not imply that a specialised regulation 
is necessarily leading the growth of the sector. Similar arguments apply also considering 
the negative correlations discussed below between the size of sector and cooperative 
societies’ regulations or banking regulations.  
Nevertheless, the results are coherent with arguments made by Poyo (2000), Jansson et 
al. (2004: 50), Cuevas and Fischer (2006), Branch and Grace (2008) and WOCCU 
(2015) that members-owned financial institutions should be regulated under specialised 
legal framework that addresses their special contractual arrangements, and the 
distinctive form of agency conflicts inherited in their structure. A specialised regulation 
should also take into account the risks faced by FCs which differ from risks faced by 
other types of cooperatives or investor-owned financial institutions, so that for instance, 
they require different licensing criteria, capital requirements, monitoring procedures, 
and risk management standards. The results are also consistent with Cull et al. (2011) 
who - though not focusing on financial cooperatives - found that profit-oriented 
microfinance institutions tends to limit their outreach to cover the costs of compliance 
with prudential regulations while maintaining the same profit rates. In contrast, not-for-
profit microfinance institutions are more likely to reduce their profit rates to maintain 
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the same outreach levels. Similarly, the findings of Akande et al. (2016) indicate the 
need for microfinance regulations to distinguish between the different institutional types 
of microfinance providers in Africa. It is not surprising then that columns (5), (10) and 
(15) in panels A and B of table 4, indicate a negative statistical correlation between 
FCs’ penetration rate, deposits and assets per GDP on one hand and general cooperative 
society’s regulation on the other hand. That is because a unified general cooperative 
society’s law that regulate the operation of all cooperative organisations is usually 
inadequate for financial intermediation activities (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 33; Branch 
and Grace, 2008: 4; WOCCU, 2015: 10). In addition, in many developing countries 
there were no tangible reforms introduced to cooperative society’s regulations since 
they were originally adopted in the 1960s and 1970s’, making them insufficient for FCs 
(Poyo, 2000: 142). While Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) did not find a direct impact 
for financial regulations on the profitability or outreach of microfinance institutions, 
they suggested an indirect effect for regulations as they found that high leveraged 
institutions are able to reach more borrowers. Such argument is also relevant for FCs, as 
adequate financial regulation - contrary to general cooperative regulations - will 
enhance the cooperatives’ ability to attract deposits or seek external funds and thus 
increase their services’ outreach. 
The results of columns (8) and (13) in panel A suggest that laws regulating traditional 
commercial banks are not associated with high indicators of FCs, with significant high 
negative correlations between the presence of a banking regulation and FCs’ deposits 
and assets per GDP. In addition to a negative correlation between the change in deposits 
per GDP and commercial banking regulation reported in and column (8) in panel B. 
These results are not entirely unexpected, as Poyo (2000: 138) and Branch and Grace 
(2008: 3) have pointed out that FCs require prudential regulations that differ from 
traditional commercial banks regulations due to their governance structure, the 
geographic or sectoral concentration of their loan portfolios, and their focus on micro 
and small entrepreneurs. Adams (1999: 44) noted that bank-supervising authorities in 
many developing countries struggle to maintain effective monitoring over commercial 
banks in the first place, and it is not clear if they have the technical capacity to perform 
adequate supervision over FCs as well. In addition, banking authorities in developing 
countries may impose rules and practices that suit commercial banks but not necessarily 
adequate for FCs (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 32).  Commercial banking regulations 
may ignore the distinctive structure of FCs, especially in terms of capital requirements 
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and governance structures. Traditional banking regulations may also impose regulatory 
burdens that are unreasonable for the non-complex activities of FCs. On the other hand, 
the results do not provide supporting evidence to Poyo (2000), WOCCU (2015: 10), and 
Branch and Grace (2008:. 4) argument that, legislations intended to govern the 
operations of all microfinance institutions do not consider the cooperative nature of FCs 
and their orientation to mobilise and promote deposit services. In fact, results of panel B 
suggest that FCs regulated by a NBFI regulation has witnessed growth in their 
penetration rate, deposits and assets per GDP. While the results in panel A do not 
indicate any significant correlation between FCs’ indicators and non-bank financial 
institutions law or dual regulatory framework. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise 
that designing a unified law that regulates cooperatives and other microfinance 
providers should respect the different institutional structure of each type of organisation. 
More specifically, a unified microfinance law should enable institutional integration 
among FCs to form advanced networks, and to be able to provide full banking services 
to their members and not just microfinance services. Thus, equal treatment does not 
imply identical treatment but unbiased treatment
4
. 
Finally, panel C shows a positive correlation between specialised FC regulation and 
GDP per capita, statistically significant at 5 per cent level. While there is a negative 
correlation between cooperative societies’ regulation and GDP per capita also 
statistically significant at 5 per cent level. Together with the results of panels A and B, it 
seems clearly that countries with high GDP per capita tend to have well-developed 
financial cooperative sector regulated under specialised law instead of a general 
cooperative law. The results also demonstrate that the size of the financial sector, as 
well as property rights and financial freedom do not play major roles in determining the 
type of law that regulates financial cooperatives.  
                                                          
4
 United Nations (2003, pp. 10) cited by Cuevas and Fischer (2006, pp. 1) 
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Table 4. Fixed-effects regression results for financial cooperatives indicators and regulations 
Panel A: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives indicators against regulations 
Dependent 
variable 
Log penetration rate Log deposit per GDP Log assets per GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
FC regulation 0.248∗∗     0.278∗∗     0.227∗∗     
 
(0.102)     (0.138)     (0.121)     
Dual regulation  0.096     0.187     0.110    
 
 (0.092)     (0.148)     (0.154)    
Bank regulation   −0.196     −0.732∗∗     −0.527∗∗   
 
  (0.152)     (0.320)     (0.250)   
NBFI regulation    0.063     0.048     0.058  
 
   (0.048)     (0.051)     (0.040)  
Cooperative      −0.316∗∗∗     −0.266∗∗∗     −0.223∗∗ 
societies regulation     (0.110)     (0.120)     (0.110) 
GDP per capita 1.208∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗ 1.552∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗ 1.504∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ 1.660∗∗∗ 1.594∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 
  (0.432) (0.437) (0.431) (0.431) (0.434) (0.520) (0.521) (0.508) (0.519) (0.522) (0.506) (0.506) (0.495) (0.502) (0.509) 
Credit to private 0.685∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 
sector (0.222) (0.220) (0.234) (0.219) (0.215) (0.272) (0.263) (0.284) (0.262) (0.266) (0.256) (0.253) (0.270) (0.251) (0.252) 
Financial freedom 0.692∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗ 0.677∗∗ 0.660∗∗ 0.597∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 
  (0.242) (0.261) (0.258) (0.256) (0.240) (0.272) (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.260) (0.263) (0.280) (0.274) (0.272) (0.255) 
Property rights −1.349∗∗∗ −1.419∗∗∗ −1.438∗∗∗ −1.425∗∗∗ −1.257∗∗∗ −1.692∗∗∗ −1.734∗∗∗ −1.791∗∗∗ −1.761∗∗∗ −1.624∗∗∗ −1.666∗∗∗ −1.706∗∗∗ −1.744∗∗∗ −1.720∗∗∗ −1.602∗∗∗∗ 
  (0.280) (0.297) (0.296) (0.296) (0.280) (0.371) (0.369) (0.366) (0.369) (0.372) (0.306) (0.322) (0.317) (0.319) (0.304) 
Constant −5.454∗∗∗ −6.095∗∗∗ −5.955∗∗∗ −5.997∗∗∗ −5.187∗∗∗ −6.986∗∗∗ −7.727∗∗∗ −7.346∗∗∗∗ −7.573∗∗∗ −6.902∗∗∗∗ −7.269∗∗∗ −7.800∗∗∗ −7.547∗∗∗ −7.701∗∗∗ −7.178∗∗∗ 
 
(1.368) (1.387) (1.374) (1.372) (1.407) (1.620) (1.631) (1.598) (1.622) (1.657) (1.571) (1.586) (1.559) (1.573) (1.616) 
F-stat 15.05∗∗∗ 13.78∗∗∗ 17.01∗∗∗ 22.56∗∗∗ 15.54∗∗∗ 15.75∗∗∗ 15.82∗∗∗ 17.50∗∗∗ 28.66∗∗∗ 15.61∗∗∗ 16.23∗∗∗ 16.27∗∗∗ 18.58∗∗∗ 48.66∗∗∗ 15.76∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1108     1065     1035     
No. of groups 65     65     65     
𝑅2(within)  0.378 0.356 0.357 0.355 0.386 0.320 0.306 0.322 0.304 0.316 0.334 0.323 0.333 0.322 0.332 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.664 −0.715 −0.704 −0.711 −0.660 −0.650 −0.703 −0.668 −0.698 −0.658 −0.687 −0.723 −0.701 −0.719 −0.691 
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Panel B: fixed-effects regressions for change in financial cooperatives indicators against regulations 
Dependent variable Change in log penetration rate Change in log deposit per GDP Change in log assets per GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Log penetration −0.165∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗           
 rate (t-1) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)           
Log deposits per      −0.269∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗      
GDP (t-1)      (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050)      
Log assets per           −0. 278∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ 
GDP (t-1)           (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
FC regulation 0. 062∗∗     0.099∗∗     0.097∗∗     
(t-1) (0.024)     (0.046)     (0.048)     
Dual regulation  0.005     0.011     −0.028    
(t-1)  (0.041)     (0.047)     (0.073)    
Bank regulation   −0.094     −0.264∗     −0.194   
(t-1)   (0.073)     (0.144)     (0.148)   
NBFI regulation    0.041∗∗∗     0.066∗∗∗     0.069∗∗∗  
(t-1)    (0.011)     (0.024)     (0.019)  
Cooperative 
Societies 
    −0.071∗∗∗     −0.093∗∗     −0.081∗∗ 
regulation (t-1)     (0.024)     (0.038)     (0.036) 
Credit to private −0.011 −0.011 −0.029 −0.009 −0.005 0.213∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 
sector (0.046) (0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.080) (0.079) (0.088) (0.079) (0.075) (0.091) (0.090) (0.099) (0.090) (0.085) 
GDP per capita 0.062 0.108 0.100 0.101 0.070 −0.085 −0.013 −0.023 −0.026 −0.069 0.067 0.124 0.126 0.121 0.086 
 
(0.099) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.176) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.189) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.192) 
Property rights −0.213∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.151) (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) (0.153) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.144) 
Financial freedom 0.115∗ 0.099 0.105 0.094 0.094 0.301∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.280∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 
 
(0.060) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.059) (0.120) (0.116) (0.119) (0.115) (0.112) (0.107) (0.105) (0.109) (0.104) (0.101) 
Constant −0.404 −0.499 −0.470 −0.478 −0.373 −0.497 −0.645 −0.619 −0.606 −0.453 −0.928 −1.037 −1.043 −1.031 −0.907 
 
(0.340) (0.358) (0.358) (0.359) (0.355) (0.646) (0.655) (0.653) (0.650) (0.649) (0.699) (0.721) (0.720) (0.719) (0.711) 
F-stat 7.12∗∗∗ 7.26∗∗∗ 7.13∗∗∗ 7.73∗∗∗ 7.98∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 6.05∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗ 4.93∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1007     949     917     
No. of countries 65     65     65     
𝑅2(within)  0.141 0.132 0.136 0.133 0.142 0.210 0.202 0.211 0.203 0.208 0.208 0.200 0.206 0.201 0.205 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.844 −0.833 −0.827 −0.835 −0.848 −0.844 −0.836 −0.837 −0.838 −0.841 −0.877 −0.880 −0.877 −0.879 −0.876 
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Panel C: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives regulations 
Dependent variable FC regulation Dual regulation Bank regulation NBFI regulation Cooperative regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Log penetration 0.100∗   0.022   −0.017   0.009   −0.115∗∗   
 rate (t-1) (0.053)   (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.008)   (0.051)   
Log deposits per  0.062   0.020   −0.031   0.005   −0.054∗  
GDP (t-1)  (0.040)   (0.017)   (0.028)   (0.006)   (0.029)  
Log assets per   0.059   0.014   −0.025   0.006   −0.054 
GDP (t-1)   (0.041)   (0.017)   (0.024)   (0.006)   (0.033) 
Credit to private 0.060 0.060 0.095 0.127 0.131 0.127 −0.131 −0.113 −0.122 −0.042 −0.040 −0.039 −0.014 −0.038 −0.060 
sector (t-1) (0.133) (0.136) (0.130) (0.088) (0.083) (0.076) (0.107) (0.111) (0.111) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.108) (0.109) (0.111) 
GDP per capita 0.666∗∗ 0.679∗∗ 0.651∗∗ −0.231 −0.209 −0.213 −0.071 −0.033 −0.044 0.164 0.177 0.172 −0.529∗∗ −0.613∗∗ −0.566∗∗ 
 (t-1) (0.280) (0.292) (0.283) (0.197) (0.215) (0.213) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.160) (0.157) (0.161) (0.247) (0.246) (0.241) 
Property rights −0.144 −0.119 −0.111 −0.078 −0.107 −0.132 −0.057 −0.079 −0.065 −0.033 −0.038 −0.050 0.312 0.343∗ 0.358∗ 
 (t-1) (0.203) (0.197) (0.205) (0.136) (0.118) (0.129) (0.041) (0.064) (0.055) (0.037) (0.046) (0.052) (0.196) (0.198) (0.200) 
Financial freedom −0.132 −0.110 −0.188 0.131 0.117 0.187 0.030 0.046 0.030 0.107 0.111 0.112 −0.136 −0.163 −0.142 
 (t-1) (0.206) (0.206) (0.193) (0.139) (0.135) (0.121) (0.023) (0.041) (0.032) (0.147) (0.161) (0.166) (0.215) (0.222) (0.232) 
Constant −1.409 −1.459 −1.363 0.785 0.748 0.727 0.264 0.080 0.141 −0.475 −0.514 −0.493 1.835∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗ 
 
(0.912) (0.946) (0.926) (0.576) (0.666) (0.663) (0.206) (0.210) (0.205) (0.489) (0.471) (0.483) (0.820) (0.799) (0.782) 
F-stat 3.40∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗ 2.93∗∗ 0.85 0.76 0.90 0.82 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.67 3.14∗∗ 2.88∗∗ 2.78∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 
No. of countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
𝑅2(within)  0.122 0.111 0.108 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.055 0.073 0.063 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.150 0.136 0.127 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.549 −0.542 −0.511 −0.406 −0.379 −0.392 −0.759 −0.649 −0.676 −0.466 −0.477 −0.471 −0.458 −0.509 −0.474 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, while no asterisk means the coefficient is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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4.2. Financial cooperatives supervisory authority 
Table 5 presents regression results exploring the correlation between FCs development - 
measured by the indicators discussed earlier- and the responsible supervisory authority, 
or the supervision model adopted in case of auxiliary and duel supervision. In these 
regressions, each of the three FCs’ indicators were regressed on dummy variables 
representing the supervisory approach adopted, which are divided into: non-bank 
financial supervisory authority; dual supervision regime; banking supervisory authority; 
auxiliary supervision; and cooperative society’s supervisory authority, in addition to the 
same set of control variables. There is no separate dummy variable for a specialised FCs 
supervisory authority, because only Kenya and South Africa had special authorities that 
supervise only FCs
5
. Nevertheless, I found no statistical significant correlation between 
FCs’ indicators and a dummy variable constructed for the specialised supervision 
adopted in Kenya and South Africa (not included in the reported results). 
Columns (1), (6) and (11) in panels A and B demonstrate how FCs supervised by non-
bank financial institutions (NBFI) supervisory authorities tend to have higher 
penetration rates with statistical significant positive correlation at the 5 per cent, and is 
positively correlated with high deposits and assets per GDP statistically significant at 10 
per cent. Panel B suggest that FCs supervised by NBFI supervisor are more likely to 
have positive changes in the size and outreach of the sector. These correlations between 
the changes in the three FCs’ indicators and non-bank financial supervision are strongly 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Whereas, the rest of the regression results do not 
suggest any statistical significant correlations between indicators of FCs and other 
supervisory approaches, namely dual supervision regime; banking supervisory 
authority, auxiliary supervision; and cooperative society’s supervisory authority. The 
exception is a negative correlation between penetration rate and the dummy variable of 
cooperative societies’ supervision at the 5 per cent level. Similar result is obtained from 
panel B, suggesting negative correlation between the change in penetration rate and 
cooperative societies’ supervision. These results are in line with argument that 
authorities responsible for the promotion and regulation of general cooperative societies 
may lack the required capacity to conduct sufficient prudential supervision over 
financial intermediary institutions, thus may hinder the development of FCs (Adams, 
1999: 44; Poyo, 2000; Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 32; BCBS, 2015a: 20). In addition, 
                                                          
5
 In Kenya by the SACCO Societies Regulatory Authority since 2008 and South Africa by the Co-
operative Banks Development Agency CBDA since 2007. 
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column (13) in panel B shows a negative correlation between the change in FCs’ assets 
per GDP and banking supervision, significant at the 10 percent level. Although the 
coefficients are not trivial and seem consistent with the results of table 4, that show 
negative correlation between FCs’ indicators and banking regulation, however, I find it 
difficult to draw a solid conclusion from this result remotely from other results that does 
not show any correlation between banking supervision and FCs. 
Moreover, the findings here do not provide insightful evidence to examine Cuevas and 
Fischer (2006: 31-32) argument in favour for dual supervision. Cuevas and Fischer 
explained how dual supervision puts the few big FCs who hold a significant number of 
members and assets under the well-developed supervision of banking authorities at 
lower cost, which can be adequate for a transition phase until establishing a unified 
supervisory framework to govern the whole sector. As noted before, effective 
monitoring and inspection over FCs is very challenging and expensive, as in many 
countries, there are hundreds or thousands of geographically remote and small FCs. 
Again, I found no evidence that auxiliary supervision (indirect supervision) is 
associated with higher degree of development in the sector, and the results do not 
support or contradict the promising perception that auxiliary supervision can overcome 
these challenges associated with supervising FCs as suggested by Cuevas and Fischer 
(2006), BCBS (2015a), and (2015b).   
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Table 5. Fixed-effects regression results for financial cooperatives indicators and supervision 
 Panel A: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives indicators against supervision  
Dependent 
variable 
Log penetration rate Log deposit per GDP Log assets per GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
NBFI supervision 0.360∗∗     0.328∗     0.304∗     
  (0.161)     (0.183)     (0.161)     
Dual supervision  −0.016     −0.099     −0.115    
   (0.132)     (0.181)     (0.159)    
Bank supervision   −0.026     −0.040     −0.074   
    (0.131)     (0.240)     (0.186)   
Auxiliary 
supervision 
   −0.079     0.042     −0.089  
     (0.175)     (0.309)     (0.250)  
Cooperative 
societies  
    −0.226∗∗     −0.201     −0.114 
 supervision     (0.139)     (0.151)     (0.143) 
GDP per capita 1.360∗∗∗ 1. 434∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗ 1.326∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 1.652∗∗∗ 1.631∗∗∗ 1.591∗∗∗ 
  (0.434) (0.430) (0.427) (0.429) (0.435) (0.515) (0.519) (0.518) (0.518) (0.520) (0.498) (0.501) (0.500) (0.499) (0.508) 
Credit to private 
sector 
0.643∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 
  (0.191) (0.219) (0.219) (0.210) (0.216) (0.245) (0.261) (0.262) (0.264) (0.264) (0.228) (0.251) (0.252) (0.244) (0.251) 
Financial freedom 0.673∗∗ 0.669∗∗ 0.675∗∗ 0.660∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 
  (0.255) (0.257) (0.258) (0.257) (0.256) (0.268) (0.270) (0.272) (0.270) (0.267) (0.269) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.266) 
Property rights −1.286∗∗∗ −1.431∗∗∗ −1.427∗∗∗ −1.433∗∗∗ −1.327∗∗∗ −1.659∗∗∗ −1.779∗∗∗ −1.760∗∗∗ −1.763∗∗∗ −1.681∗∗∗ −1.590∗∗∗ −1.739∗∗∗ −1.713∗∗∗ −1.727∗∗∗ −1.674∗∗∗ 
  (0.266) (0.295) (0.294) (0.296) (0.278) (0.355) (0.367) (0.368) (0.369) (0.365) (0.294) (0.315) (0.319) (0.318) (0.300) 
Constant −5.884∗∗∗ −6.026∗∗∗ −6.047∗∗∗ −5.983∗∗∗ −5.625∗∗∗ −7.486∗∗∗ −7.608∗∗∗ −7.628∗∗∗ −7.614∗∗∗ −7.230∗∗∗ −7.610∗∗∗ −7.734∗∗∗ −7.771∗∗∗ −7.683∗∗∗ −7.552∗∗∗ 
  (1.372) (1.366) (1.358) (1.369) (1.402) (1.603) (1.618) (1.620) (1.630) (1.640) (1.551) (1.567) (1.569) (1.571) (1.603) 
F-stat 15.57∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗ 14.24∗∗∗ 14.08∗∗∗ 14.00∗∗∗ 16.31∗∗∗ 16.17∗∗∗ 15.87∗∗∗ 15.87∗∗∗ 15.45∗∗∗ 17.27∗∗∗ 16.77∗∗∗ 16.30∗∗∗ 16.72∗∗∗ 16.56∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1108     1065     1035     
No. of countries 65     65     65     
𝑅2(within)  0.381 0.355 0.355 0.356 0.368 0.315 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.310 0.335 0.323 0.322 0.322 0.324 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.669 −0.714 −0.714 −0.707 −0.693 −0.667 −0.704 −0.700 −0.702 −0.682 −0.691 −0.725 −0.721 −0.716 −0.713 
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Panel B: fixed-effects regressions for change in financial cooperatives indicators against supervision 
 
Change in log penetration rate Change in log deposit per GDP Change in log assets per GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Log penetration −0.164∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗           
rate (t-1) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)           
Log deposits per      −0.269∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗      
GDP (t-1)      (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)      
Log assets per           −0.280∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ 
GDP (t-1)           (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
NBFI supervision 0.068∗∗     0.142∗∗∗     0.132∗∗∗     
(t-1) (0.030)     (0.053)     (0.044)     
Dual supervision  0.024     0.022     −0.027    
(t-1)  (0.042)     (0.055)     (0.057)    
Bank supervision   −0.006     −0.120     −0.133∗   
(t-1)   (0.038)     (0.079)     (0.071)   
Auxiliary 
supervision 
   0.015     0.066     0.053  
(t-1)    (0.047)     (0.096)     (0.090)  
Cooperative 
societies 
    −0.067∗∗     −0.062     −0.053 
supervision (t-1)     (0.025)     (0.042)     (0.042) 
Credit to private −0.017 −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.009 0.197∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 
sector (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.088) 
GDP per capita 0.101 0.104 0.108 0.107 0.081 −0.034 −0.019 0.008 −0.012 −0.041 0.113 0.134 0.150 0.133 0.111 
 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.174) (0.178) (0.169) (0.176) (0.177) (0.190) (0.196) (0.192) (0.193) (0.195) 
Property rights −0.209∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.460∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ 
 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.147) (0.151) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151) (0.140) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) 
Financial freedom 0.102 0.099 0.101 0.101 0.095 0.274∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.280∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.252∗∗ 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.114) (0.116) (0.111) (0.115) (0.116) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) 
Constant −0.502 −0.491 −0.500 −0.502 −0.403 −0.620 −0.631 −0.714 −0.668 −0.541 −1.054 −1.067 −1.123 −1.080 −0.986 
 
(0.359) (0.359) (0.361) (0.360) (0.353) (0.639) (0.650) (0.617) (0.647) (0.650) (0.705) (0.723) (0.708) (0.713) (0.722) 
F-stat 7.70∗∗∗ 7.78∗∗∗ 7.37∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗ 8.45∗∗∗ 7.01∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 7.48∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 5.95∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 6.58∗∗∗ 5.04∗∗∗ 5.04∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1007     949     917     
No. of countries 65     65     65     
𝑅2(within)  0.138 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.139 0.210 0.202 0.208 0.204 0.204 0.209 0.200 0.207 0.201 0.201 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.833 −0.827 −0.832 −0.836 −0.842 −0.840 −0.833 −0.827 −0.838 −0.836 −0.875 −0.882 −0.875 −0.881 −0.876 
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Panel C: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives supervision 
Dependent variable NBFI supervision Dual supervision Bank supervision Auxiliary supervision Cooperative supervision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Log penetration  0.082∗   0.000   −0.010   −0.019   −0.053   
rate (t-1) (0.048)   (0.018)   (0.025)   (0.038)   (0.042)   
Log deposits per  0.039   −0.007   0.002   0.000   −0.034  
GDP (t-1)  (0.027)   (0.011)   (0.035)   (0.036)   (0.026)  
Log assets per   0.048   −0.010   0.005   −0.020   −0.022 
GDP (t-1)   (0.034)   (0.013)   (0.030)   (0.037)   (0.028) 
Credit to private 0.121 0.144 0.153 0.010 0.017 0.018 0.043 0.027 0.030 −0.178∗ −0.192∗ −0.192 0.004 0.004 −0.009 
sector (t-1) (0.088) (0.094) (0.099) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.097) (0.101) (0.100) (0.082) (0.086) (0.087) 
GDP per capita 0.127 0.160 0.169 0.081 0.120 0.105 0.245 0.226 0.156 −0.066 −0.077 −0.045 −0.387 −0.428∗ −0.385∗ 
(t-1) (0.176) (0.163) (0.171) (0.087) (0.091) (0.098) (0.187) (0.173) (0.161) (0.120) (0.113) (0.108) (0.241) (0.229) (0.229) 
Property rights −0.206 −0.197 −0.274∗ −0.082 −0.129 −0.113 −0.027 −0.003 0.064 −0.007 0.022 0.004 0.321 0.307 0.319 
(t-1) (0.148) (0.131) (0.161) (0.095) (0.085) (0.101) (0.124) (0.138) (0.123) (0.069) (0.080) (0.079) (0.192) (0.190) (0.200) 
Financial freedom −0.099 −0.089 −0.114 0.028 0.026 0.046 0.244∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.205∗ −0.096∗ −0.101∗ −0.095∗ −0.078 −0.083 −0.043 
(t-1) (0.094) (0.093) (0.102) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.115) (0.120) (0.110) (0.048) (0.056) (0.052) (0.139) (0.139) (0.135) 
Constant −0.035 −0.177 −0.144 −0.078 −0.204 −0.176 −0.731 −0.655 −0.442 0.441 0.502 0.360 1.403∗ 1.534∗∗ 1.402∗ 
 
(0.568) (0.508) (0.541) (0.265) (0.291) (0.313) (0.640) (0.586) (0.547) (0.383) (0.353) (0.328) (0.805) (0.750) (0.755) 
F-stat 1.68 1.45 1.61 0.69 0.69 0.76 1.10 1.11 0.92 1.10 1.11 1.10 2.19∗ 2.09∗ 2.02∗ 
No. of obs. 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 1007 972 943 
No. of countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
𝑅2(within)  0.090 0.072 0.089 0.009 0.017 0.011 0.034 0.034 0.026 0.039 0.037 0.042 0.091 0.088 0.075 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.302
° −0.424 −0.403 −0.019 −0.109 −0.116 −0.340 −0.321 −0.256 −0.232 −0.258 −0.147 −0.274° −0.315 −0.276° 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, while no asterisk means the coefficient is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ° Represents p-value above 5% of Hausman-test suggesting that random-effects estimations are more consistent (see 
table A.2). 
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Panel C in table 5 suggests that countries that adopt auxiliary supervision to supervise 
FCs tend to have low levels of financial freedom and financial sector development, as 
shown in columns (10), (11) and (12), with a negative correlation between domestic 
credit to private sector and financial freedom with auxiliary supervision, statistically 
significant at 10 per cent. Whereas columns, (7), (8) and (9) suggest that, the banking 
supervisory authority is responsible for the FC sector in countries that have high levels 
of financial freedom. However, the consistency of these conclusions should be 
questioned in light of the statistical insignificance of the whole regression under 
estimation. Anyhow, it is clear that the classification of supervisory approaches 
analysed in this section does not provide sufficient information on the quality and the 
capacity of the bank, dual and auxiliary supervisory approaches. Monitoring the 
operations of FCs might be handled differently with specialised department or staff 
even if they fall under the supervision of a banking supervisory authority or an auxiliary 
supervision.  In that case, the supervisor may allocate the required resources, tools, 
warning systems and corrective actions, which can be appropriate for effective 
monitoring of financial institutions with cooperative structure. While in other cases, the 
bank supervisory authority may apply an inadequate approach for monitoring FCs, or 
may lack the necessary resources and expertise. Thus, the same dummy variables that 
represent banking supervisor or auxiliary supervision may include different monitoring 
and supervision mechanisms. 
4.3. Deposit insurance schemes for financial cooperatives 
Table 6 shows the correlations between financial cooperatives’ indicators and a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the financial cooperative sector is covered by a deposit 
insurance scheme, and the value 0 if not, using the same set of control variables.  
Columns (1), (2) and (3) in panel A show positive correlations between financial 
cooperatives’ penetration rate, deposits and assets per GDP on one hand, and the 
presence of a deposit insurance scheme on the other hand. The correlation is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent levels for penetration rate and deposits per GDP 
respectively, and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for assets per GDP. Panel 
B also suggests that deposit insurance schemes encourages the growth of financial 
cooperatives, with positive correlation between deposit insurance and the change in 
FCs’ indicators, significant at the 1 per cent level. These results are consistent with Esty 
(1997: 26) who argued that mutual-owned financial institutions are less likely to adopt 
high-risk financial strategies, because the incentive to adopt high-risk behaviour is 
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determined mainly by whether the residual and fixed claims are separable or not. Claims 
are not separable in the case of mutual organisations, like cooperatives, so the total 
wealth of members is unaffected by the increase of the institution’s risk behaviour, as 
the residual claim’s possible gains is balanced by the possible losses on the fixed claim. 
That is why cooperatives are less likely to adopt risk-taking behaviour in the first place, 
even in the presence of deposit insurance systems, taking into account of course that the 
indicators tested here do not measure the risk-taking behaviour or the financial 
performance of financial cooperatives. These results however provide preliminary 
evidence that the introduction of deposit insurance may lead the financial cooperative 
sector to grow, because of increasing confidence in the sector, which helps in attracting 
new depositors (members), or encourage existing members to invest more in their 
cooperative. Karels and McClatchey (1999) found no evidence that credit unions’ risk-
taking behaviour in the United States had increased after the adoption of deposit 
insurance scheme, during the period 1971-1990. Their results showed that liquidity and 
asset quality improved, suggesting a decrease in risk–taking behaviour during the post 
deposit insurance period. However, Karels and McClatchey (1999: 132) suggested that 
not only the ownership structure that limits risk-taking behaviour is the reason for credit 
unions’ stability, but also the strong regulatory environment adopted in the 1970s that 
had restricted credit unions’ investment strategies. As regulations at that time imposed 
limitations on the maximum loan size that can be offered by credit unions, and the 
maximum maturity for secured and unsecured loans. Similarly, Hannafin and McKillop 
(2007) found no evidence of risk shifting behaviour in the performance of Irish credit 
unions after to the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in 1989. 
However, again a causal relation between deposit insurance and FCs’ size and outreach 
is difficult to demonstrate here. Panel C shows that countries with deposit insurance 
schemes tend to have high penetration rate, deposit and assets per GDP in the previous 
year, and they have higher GDP per capita than their counterparts. These results are in 
line with the categorisation of financial cooperative evolutionary stages proposed by 
Ferguson and McKillop (2000). According to Ferguson and McKillop, the global 
financial cooperative movement can be divided into mature, transitional and nascent 
industries, whereas the establishment of deposit insurance mechanism is one of the key 
attributes of mature financial cooperative sectors alongside with large asset base.  
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Table 6. Fixed-effects regression results for financial cooperatives indicators and 
deposit insurance 
 Panel A: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives indicators against deposit 
insurance 
 Dependent variable Log penetration rate 
Log deposit per 
GDP 
Log assets per GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Deposit insurance 0.293∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 
  (0.096) (0.116) (0.112) 
GDP per capita 1.172∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.435∗∗∗ 
  (0.397) (0.508) (0.494) 
Credit to private sector 0.669∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 
  (0.213) (0.271) (0.252) 
Financial freedom 0.626∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 
  (0.222) (0.270) (0.252) 
Property rights −1.395∗∗∗ −1.725∗∗∗ −1.700∗∗∗ 
  (0.276) (0.366) (0.309) 
Constant −5.255∗∗∗ −6.703∗∗∗ −7.132∗∗∗ 
  (1.257) (1.584) (1.543) 
F-stat 16.48∗∗∗ 18.34∗∗∗ 17.14∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1108 1065 1035 
No. of countries 65 65 65 
𝑅2 (within) 0.387 0.329 0.337 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.653 −0.634 −0.680 
    
 Panel B: fixed-effects regressions for change in financial cooperatives indicators against 
deposit insurance 
Dependent variable 
Change in 
log penetration rate 
Change in 
log deposit per GDP 
Change in 
log assets per GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log penetration rate (t-1) −0.159∗∗∗   
 
(0.031)   
Log deposits per GDP (t-1)  −0.268∗∗∗  
 
 (0.049)  
Log assets per GDP (t-1)   −0.276∗∗∗ 
 
  (0.058) 
Deposit insurance (t-1) 0.018 0.072∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.030) 
Credit to private sector −0.011 0.211∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 
 
(0.044) (0.079) (0.089) 
GDP per capita 0.095 −0.068 0.096 
 
(0.101) (0.179) (0.192) 
Property rights −0.222∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ 
 
(0.067) (0.149) (0.142) 
Financial freedom 0.099 0.274∗∗ 0.252∗∗ 
 
(0.063) (0.114) (0.104) 
Constant −0.465 −0.504 −0.968 
 
(0.349) (0.645) (0.706) 
F-stat 7.43∗∗∗ 6.25∗∗∗ 5.04∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1007 949 917 
No. of countries 65 65 65 
𝑅2 (within) 0.132 0.206 0.202 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.834 −0.837 −0.875 
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 Panel C: fixed-effects regressions for financial cooperatives deposit insurance 
Dependent variable Deposit insurance Deposit insurance Deposit insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log penetration rate (t-1) 0.165∗∗∗   
 
(0.046)   
Log deposits per GDP (t-1)  0.095∗∗∗  
 
 (0.035)  
Log assets per GDP (t-1)   0.095∗∗ 
 
  (0.041) 
Credit to private sector (t-1) 0.013 0.045 0.067 
 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.123) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.587∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 
 
(0.274) (0.310) (0.302) 
Property rights (t-1) 0.078 0.017 0.056 
 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.152) 
Financial freedom (t-1) 0.011 −0.009 −0.003 
 
(0.214) (0.238) (0.242) 
Constant −1.359 −1.647 −1.477 
 
(0.839) (0.979) (0.964) 
F-stat 4.57∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ 
No. of obs. 1007 972 943 
No. of countries 65 65 65 
𝑅2 (within) 0.135 0.120 0.106 
Corr (μi, X)  −0.505 −0.532 −0.471
° 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, while no 
asterisk means the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ° Represents p-value above 5% of Hausman-test suggesting that random-effects estimations 
are more consistent (see table A6.3). 
 
As for the control variables, panels A in tables 4, 5 and 6 show statistically significant 
positive correlation between FCs’ penetration rate, deposits per GDP, and assets per 
GDP on one hand and GDP per capita, domestic credit provided by banks, financial 
freedom on the other hand. Moreover, there is statistically significant negative 
correlation between the development of FCs and property rights index. These results are 
similar to the ones reported in Khafagy (2017). The positive correlation between FCs 
development indicators and GDP per capita is also consistent with Périlleux et al. 
(2016) showing that the level of economic development matters for the development of 
FCs. It is also in line with results of panel C in table 4 (discussed above); which suggest 
that a specialised FC regulation is associated with high GDP per capita while 
cooperative societies’ regulations are adopted in countries with lower GDP per capita. 
Contrary to Périlleux et al. (2016), the results here show a statistically significant 
positive correlation between financial sector development (measured by domestic credit 
provided by banks) and FCs indicators. These findings are further supported by the 
results of panel B in tables 4 to 6, which show a statistically significant positive 
correlation between the growth of FCs’ deposits and assets per GDP and domestic credit 
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provided to private sector. Furthermore, the positive correlation between financial 
freedom index and FCs indicators suggests that the development of the FC sector 
requires sound financial policies and regulations, and less intervention by the state in 
the operations of financial institutions or the allocation of credit in the financial sector. 
Finally, panels A and B show a statistically negative correlation between property rights 
index and FCs’ growth. Khafagy (2017: 490) argued that the negative correlation 
between FCs’ indicators and protection of property rights is reasonable because strict 
property rights laws aim to protect those who already have ‘formal’ assets, and limit the 
economic activities of the informal sector, where FCs’ members are usually involved. 
5. Conclusion 
This essay examines the relationship between the development of financial cooperatives 
and the type of regulation that governs the sector, the supervisory agency responsible to 
monitor their activities, and the existence of a deposit insurance scheme, using panel 
data collected for sixty-five developing countries. Although causality is difficult to 
establish using only statistical methods, the results of this essay cautiously provide new 
empirical evidence to understand what is best suitable for the development of FCs. The 
main results can be summarized as follows. 
First, high indicators of FCs and the growth of the sector are positively correlated with 
specialized regulations, giving support for opinions preferring that members-owned 
financial institutions should be regulated by specialised legislations. That can be 
considered the central conclusion in the analysis; a specialised regulation for FCs is 
more likely to support the growth of the sector, because FCs have different economic 
objectives, ownership structure and face different risks and challenges, such as access to 
liquidity facilities, net-savers against net-borrowers agency problems, low 
compensation for managers… etc. All of which require different regulatory approach 
compared to traditional investor-owned financial institutions and other types of 
cooperative organisations. Second, there are serious concerns over the viability of 
applying commercial bank regulations to FCs in developing countries, as the findings 
indicate that commercial bank regulation is negatively associated with FCs’ deposits 
and assets per GDP. Commercial bank regulations may ignore the distinctive nature of 
FCs, especially its capital and governance structures, and may impose excessive 
regulatory burdens that are unreasonable for the non-complex activities of financial 
cooperatives. For instance, high capital adequacy requirements may restrain financial 
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cooperatives’ growth rate compared to other investor-owned financial institutions, 
because equity is the amount of capital solely owned by the cooperative and which 
cannot be claimed by members or by external parties. For that, accumulated reserves are 
usually considered the main resource for cooperatives’ equity, and shares held by the 
members are not treated as part of the equity in many cases. Compared to traditional 
banks, lower minimum initial capital requirements for FCs can be adequate giving the 
simplicity of their activities and their risk exposure. 
Third, general cooperative societies’ regulations are negatively correlated with 
penetration rate and deposits and assets per GDP. Such results are consistent with the 
view that a unified regulation that regulates the operation of all cooperative 
organisations is usually inadequate for financial intermediation activities. A unified 
cooperative regulation may not have sound measurements for protecting the members’ 
deposits, or may not stress on creating a minimum capital base that enable cooperatives 
to mitigate unexpected losses. FCs also should apply prudential-financial standards and 
supervision, as well as facilitating access to liquidity mechanisms, money transfer, 
payment channels, settlement and clearing networks, all of which may be ignored in a 
general cooperative societies’ regulation. Fourth, supervision by authorities responsible 
for supervising non-bank financial institutions is positively associated with high FCs’ 
indicators. The results, however, do not support or contradict the arguments in favour 
for auxiliary supervision, as a promising approach to overcome challenges associated 
with supervising FCs, as we found no evidence that auxiliary supervision is associated 
with higher degree of development in the sector.  
Fifth, the baseline regression analysis indicated a negative correlation between FCs’ 
outreach and supervision under a general cooperative societies’ supervisor, and no 
statistical correlation with the FCs’ deposits and assets per GDP. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that authorities responsible for the supervision of general 
cooperative societies, in most developing countries, lack the required capacity to 
conduct sufficient prudential supervision over financial intermediary institutions that 
negatively affect the development of the sector. Finally, deposit insurance schemes are 
positively correlated with FCs development, providing cautious evidence that the 
introduction of deposit insurance may encourage the growth of FCs, by building 
confidence in the sector and attract new depositors (members) or encourage existing 
members to invest more in their cooperative. Noting that our calculations do not capture 
the risk-taking behaviour or the financial performance of FCs, so we cannot 
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demonstrate whether deposit insurance schemes threaten the stability of the sector or 
not. 
Financial cooperatives are not only significant for financial inclusion and economic 
growth, but their unique organisational structure could enable them to stimulate 
inclusive economic development by redistributing economic resources and 
opportunities in their economies. Because of that, financial cooperatives regulations 
must be flexible and responsive to the distinctive function of cooperatives and the 
complexity of the overall financial sector, in order to guarantee the stability of the sector 
and protect the interests of the members. Thus, a specialised legal framework seems to 
be the most suitable approach to regulate and supervise the sector. 
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